Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty by Smith, D. Gordon
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Faculty Scholarship
10-18-2013
Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty
D. Gordon Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, and the Contracts
Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
D. Gordon Smith, ????????????? ??????? ????????? ????, 2014 U. Iʟʟ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1783.
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The Delaware Supreme Court recently referred to "contractually
adopted fiduciary duties." Although some commentators, including
Larry Ribstein, view fiduciary duties as a type of contract term, the
notion of contractually adopted fiduciary duties is incoherent. The
need to opt in to fiduciary duties would arise in only two circum-
stances: (1) fiduciary relationships that do not invoke fiduciary duties
without contractual authorization, and (2) non fiduciary relationships
in which the parties wish to invoke fiduciary duties that would other-
wise be absent. The first category of relationships does not exist, as
courts impose fiduciary duties when the structure of a relationship in-
dicates that fiduciary duties are justified, and the second category of
cases is rare-and should be nonexistent-as independent contracting
parties generally have no reason to opt in to the fiduciary regime be-
cause fiduciary duties simply do not make sense outside of fiduciary
relationships.
Nevertheless, the issue arises occasionally in judicial opinions,
and this Essay offers a simple proposal to clarify the line between fi-
duciary duties and contractual duties. When a duty arises from the
language of a contract, that duty is a contractual duty, but if a duty
arises as a matter of common law because the structure of the rela-
tionship comports with the description of fiduciary relationships, that
duty is a fiduciary duty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
William Gatz was the manager of a Delaware limited liability com-
pany that had been formed to develop the Long Island National Golf
Course. When Gatz engaged in a conflict-of-interest transaction with the
company, the minority investors sued, claiming both a breach of contract
and a breach of fiduciary duty. The company's operating agreement con-
tained a provision specifying that any conflict-of-interest transaction
must have terms comparable to an arms-length transaction. The
Delaware Supreme Court called this provision a "contracted-for fiduci-
ary obligation,"and concluded that the agreement "by its plain language,
contractually adopts the fiduciary duty standard of entire fairness .... I
In this Article I argue that the Delaware Supreme Court was confused
about the proper relationship between fiduciary and contractual duties.
My thesis is that the fiduciary duty of loyalty, properly understood, can-
not be adopted contractually. I suggest a simple interpretive rule for
courts to remove the confusion.2
Fiduciary duty has been described as "messy, ' "atomistic, " 4 and
"elusive," 5 and one commentator recently observed, "fiduciary law has
been characterized as one of the least understood of all legal con-
structs."' 6 Perhaps as a result of these conceptual challenges, law profes-
sors traditionally have taught fiduciary law in small portions, complicat-
ing the search for overarching principles. In his provocative article, Are
Partners Fiduciaries? 7 Larry Ribstein attempted to "reduce the confu-
sion by arguing for a precise definition of the relationships that give rise
to default fiduciary duties."8 Ribstein's definition of fiduciary relation-
ships distinguishes centrally managed firms, where fiduciary duty is ap-
propriate, from firms in which all of the owners are active managers,
where fiduciary duty is inappropriate. 9 This definition would result in a
1. Gatz Props., LLC v Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1213, 1216 (Del. 2012).
2. In another part of the opinion, discussed below in Part II, the Delaware Supreme Court
questioned the existence of default fiduciary duties in Delaware limited liability companies. In 2013
the Delaware legislature amended the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, expressly confirming
that fiduciary duties exist in Delaware limited liability companies, unless otherwise provided in the
LLC agreement. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2014) ("In any case not provided for in
this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary du-
ties and the law merchant, shall govern."). The resolution of this issue does not answer the issue ad-
dressed by this Essay, namely, whether fiduciary duties may be contractually adopted.
3. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1400 (2002).
4. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 915.
5. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1743 (2001).
6. Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law's "Holy Grail": Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fidu-
ciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 923 (2011).
7. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209 [hereinafter Ribstein,
Partners].
8. Id. at 212. Ribstein expanded his views in a subsequent article, Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing
Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899 (2011) [hereinafter Ribstein, Fencing].
9. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 212 ("[D]efault fiduciary duties should be confined to
relationships that involve the contractual delegation of broad power over one's property.").
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narrower application of fiduciary duty than is generally accepted by
courts and commentators,0 a result that Ribstein embraces on the
ground that it "protects contracting parties' ability to delineate their
rights and obligations to suit their particular relationships."11
A few years prior to Ribstein's publication I published The Critical
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty,12 which proposed a "unified theory
of fiduciary duty" based on the structure of fiduciary relationships.13
Ribstein14 and other commentators 15 have noted similarities in our ap-
proaches. Despite the similarities between the Critical Resource Theory
("CRT") and Ribstein's theory, our views on fiduciary law differ in at
least one important way: Ribstein suggested that we shared a belief that
"fiduciary duties are basically contractual,"16 but the CRT holds that fi-
duciary duty is distinct from contract.17 Distinguishing fiduciary duty
from contractual duty is fundamental to a correct understanding and ap-
plication of fiduciary law. As illustrated by Gatz Properties, LLC v. Au-
riga Capital Corp., described above, confusion over fiduciary duty per-
sists, even among sophisticated judges.
Part II describes the duty of loyalty as a distinctive legal obligation
that applies only in fiduciary relationships and is designed to regulate the
exercise of fiduciary power. Part III invokes the Gatz case to illustrate
why "contractual adoption" of fiduciary duty would not be a wise or use-
ful public policy. Part IV offers a simple proposal to clarify the line be-
tween the duty of loyalty and contractual duties.
II. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY IN CONTEXT
Larry Ribstein based his theory of fiduciary law on a "paradigm" re-
lationship, in which "an 'owner' who controls and derives the residual
10. Id. at 232 ("The strong medicine of fiduciary duties is ... appropriate only for a narrow class
of cases.").
11. Id. at 213. Ribstein argues that "[a]pplying fiduciary duties broadly threatens to undermine
parties' contracts by imposing obligations the parties do not want or expect," id., but this would seem
to be true whether fiduciary duties were applied broadly or narrowly. Perhaps anticipating this con-
cern, Ribstein asserts, "The law better serves parties' contracts by applying fiduciary duties only in the
particular settings in which they are most appropriate, thereby clearly notifying parties of the situa-
tions where they may need to modify these duties." Id. The notion that contracting parties actually
know about or understand fiduciary law is questionable, even in many of the centrally managed firms
invoked by Ribstein.
12. Smith, supra note 3.
13. Id. at 1400.
14. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 212 n.15.
15. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good Faith
for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 129 n.24 (2006); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of
Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 276 n.123 (2011) [hereinafter Miller, Theory].
16. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 212 n.15; cf. Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58
MCGILL L.J. 969, 987 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Justifying] (classifying CRT as a "reductivist argu-
ment" from the law of property).
17. Smith, supra note 3, at 1492. Paul Miller treats CRT as a "reductivist argument" holding that
"fiduciary duties are not distinctive but are rather derived from other bases of private liability."
Miller, Justifying, supra note 16, at 980. Although CRT employs the property-like concept of "critical
resources," and acknowledges the ability of parties to tailor fiduciary duties through contract, CRT
maintains that fiduciary relationships are distinctive.
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benefit from property delegates open-ended management power over
property to a 'manager.'1 8i  Although some recognized fiduciary rela-
tionships do not fit this agency paradigm,19 Ribstein was not attempting
to explain current legal rules. Rather, he was attempting to justify the
imposition of fiduciary duties in certain relationships that are "character-
ized by separation of ownership and control."20 According to Ribstein,
fiduciary relationships are a subset of economic agency relationships21 in
which "the fiduciary's discretion cannot readily be constrained by devices
other than fiduciary duties without undermining the owner's objectives
in delegating control."2 Thus, in Ribstein's view the key to distinguish-
ing fiduciary relationships from other relationships is the open-ended
delegation of management power.23 CRT describes this feature of fiduci-
ary relationships as the exercise of discretion over a critical resource be-
longing to another.24 Under both theories the fiduciary duty of loyalty is
a distinctive legal obligation25 that adheres only in fiduciary relation-
ships2 6 and is designed to regulate the exercise of fiduciary power.27
Fiduciaries exercise their power or discretion in the face of incom-
plete contracts.28 As a result, beneficiaries in fiduciary relationships are
always vulnerable to opportunism.29 The potential for opportunism in
18. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 215. The CRT uses the term "critical resource" instead of
"property" and refers to "discretion" rather than "management power." Smith, supra note 3, at 1402
03. In addition, "delegation" is not required under the CRT, but the fiduciary acts "on behalf of" the
owner of the critical resource. Id. at 1403. Nevertheless, all of these concepts are almost interchange-
able between the two theories, thus leading to the observation that the theories are quite similar.
19. Smith, supra note 3, at 1403.
20. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 215. The "separation of ownership and control" is typi-
cally associated with corporate law. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932) ("The corporate system appears only when this type
of private or 'close' corporation has given way to an essentially different form, the quasi-public corpo-
ration: a corporation in which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place
through the multiplication of owners.").
21. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 215 ("A fiduciary relationship is necessarily one of agency
in the economic sense because it is characterized by separation of ownership and control. But it does
not follow that all economic agencies are necessarily fiduciary relationships." (footnote omitted)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 217.
24. Smith, supra note 3, at 1402.
25. Id. at 1409 ("[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is distinctive. Although fiduciaries are not the
only people who owe a duty of loyalty... the content of the duty of loyalty imposed in the fiduciary
context is unique .... In the fiduciary context, the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to adjust her
behavior on an ongoing basis to avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs the beneficiary.").
26. See Paul D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1, 26
(Timothy G. Youdan ed., 1989) (noting that the fiduciary principle "has been used, and is demonstra-
bly used, to maintain the integrity, credibility and utility of relationships perceived to be of importance
in a society").
27. Paul Miller describes "fiduciary power" as "a form of authority wielded by the fiduciary rela-
tive to the beneficiary." Miller, Justifying, supra note 16, at 1017.
28. See D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 616
(2014).
29. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 470 (2010) (noting that "all beneficiaries are vulnerable to
the fiduciary's abuse of legally entrusted administrative power over their legal and practical inter-
ests"); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEENS L.J. 259, 275
(2005) (asserting that a fiduciary obligation arises "whenever one party unilaterally assumes discre-
tionary power of an administrative nature over the important interests of another, interests that are
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the fiduciary context-as opposed to a relationship of independent con-
tractors-is particularly acute because a person who engages a fiduciary
agrees to become responsible for the fiduciary's decisions and actions, at
least to the extent that those decisions and actions are not self-
interested.30 This responsibility does not always include potential liability
to the third party,31 but it always involves the beneficiary placing the crit-
ical resource or other assets at risk. The fiduciary duty of loyalty re-
quires fiduciaries to sacrifice their own self-interest on behalf of the ben-
eficiaries of the duty3 2 to protect those beneficiaries from opportunism by
the fiduciaries.33
Although the fiduciary duty of loyalty is imposed by courts, usually
without regard to the express or implied terms of any contract, Ribstein
describes the duty as "a type of contract term".34 Characterizing fiduci-
ary duties in this way allows Ribstein to advance the ideal of private or-
dering.3 5 Ribstein acknowledges the existence of "default" fiduciary du-
ties-duties implied as a matter of law by courts36 -but he rejects
"mandatory" fiduciary duties. Default rules of fiduciary law are useful in
many relationships because of "the owner's inability directly to observe,
evaluate, and discipline the manager's performance."37 Nevertheless, if
especially vulnerable to the fiduciary's discretion"). On the nature of opportunism in contractual rela-
tionships, see D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 2
n.3 (2009) (discussing "opportunism" and "moral hazard").
30. Both Ribstein and Smith focus their examination of fiduciary law on the duty of loyalty. See
Ribstein, Fencing, supra note 8, at 904 ("Parties' self-interest usually can motivate them to act reason-
ably carefully where they are effectively disciplined by the product and job markets. But a self-dealing
fiduciary's self-interest can overwhelm these extra-legal constraints. This intuition supports defining
the fiduciary duty in terms of loyalty rather than care."); Smith, supra note 3, at 1409 ("[T]his concep-
tion of fiduciary duty is limited to the duty of loyalty, as opposed to the duty of care. References to a
'fiduciary duty of care' are common, and fiduciaries routinely owe a duty of care. Of course, many
other people also owe a duty of care. More importantly, while the content of that duty of care may be
stated in terms of ordinary negligence or gross negligence, depending on context, the intensity of the
duty of care is not dependent on whether the person acting is a fiduciary." (footnote omitted)). Even
in the case of self-interested decisions, the beneficiary may be responsible to a third party, but the fi-
duciary can be forced to compensate the beneficiary for any breach of fiduciary duty, thus offsetting
this external liability.
31. In other words, not all fiduciary relationships fit the "agency model" presumed by Ribstein.
For example, physicians, priests, and other counselors often form fiduciary relationships but typically
do not fit the agency model. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1423 n.98.
32. Id. at 141(-11 ("While any action that harms the beneficiary might in some sense constitute a
breach of loyalty, courts typically reserve the label 'loyalty' for self-interested actions.").
33. Id. at 1402 ("[T]he duty of loyalty that is the essence of fiduciary duty protects beneficiaries
against opportunistic behavior by fiduciaries.").
34. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 215.
35. "Private ordering" here is used as a near synonym for "contracting" or "transacting." See D.
Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12
(2011).
36. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 218 ("[T]he parties agree to fiduciary duties by contract-
ing for the particular kind of relationship in which default fiduciary duties apply."). For an extended
discussion of Ribstein's views on default fiduciary duties, see Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Con-
tracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537 (1997).
37. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 217. According to Ribstein, "classic" examples of fiduci-
ary relationships are public corporations and trusts: "In these situations the owners' costs of obtaining
information necessary to manage on a day-to-day basis are high, so that ex post judicial review of con-
flicts of interest is potentially valuable." Id.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
the parties wish to avoid application of fiduciary law, Ribstein would al-
low them to do that completely. Under this view, fiduciary duties are
within the control of the parties in that they can decide whether to form a
fiduciary relationship.
Somewhat slighted in Ribstein's analysis is the reason an owner
wishes to control a manager. Quite simply, the owner is concerned about
the possibility that the manager will deplete the owner's property. As
noted above, the owner does not have this same risk when entering into a
relationship with an independent contractor. Thus, while a beneficiary
may choose to contract out of fiduciary duties, an independent contract-
ing party generally would not think to "contract in" to the fiduciary re-
gime. Indeed, in the absence of a delegation of managerial power or ex-
ercise of discretion over a critical resource, the fiduciary duty of loyalty
simply does not make sense.
The foregoing analysis also suggests the value of the fiduciary duty
of loyalty as a default rule in fiduciary relationships. Beneficiaries in
these relationships are vulnerable to opportunism by fiduciaries,38 and
the fiduciary duty of loyalty not only protects those relationships once
formed,3 9 but "emboldens parties to enter into contractual relationships
even where some discretion is left unconstrained. '40 This furthers the
fundamental value of promoting entrepreneurial action.41
III. CONTRACTUAL ADOPTION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
The introduction of this Essay describes Gatz Properties, LLC v.
Auriga Capital Corp., in which the Delaware Supreme Court introduced
the notion of "contractually adopted fiduciary duties. ' 42  The need to
"opt in" to the fiduciary duty of loyalty could arise in only two circum-
stances: (1) fiduciary relationships that do not invoke a duty of loyalty
without contractual authorization and (2) nonfiduciary relationships in
which the parties wish to invoke a duty of loyalty that would otherwise
be absent. The latter relationships will be discussed in Part IV. Gatz is a
peculiar example of the former relationships. In this Part I argue that
Gatz illustrates why allowing "contractual adoption" of the fiduciary du-
ty of loyalty would not be a wise or useful public policy.
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Gatz stands in contrast
to the lower court opinion by Chancellor Leo Strine who referred to the
contractual fairness provision in that case as an "arms-length mandate. 43
Chancellor Strine held that the manager's behavior in Gatz constituted a
38. Smith & Lee, supra note 28, at 620 ("Although incomplete contracts are inevitable, contract-
ing parties routinely create fiduciary relationships, in which one party (the beneficiary) seems especial-
ly vulnerable to opportunism by the counterparty (the fiduciary).").
39. See Finn, supra note 26.
40. Smith & Lee, supra note 28, at 631.
41. D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2013).
42. Gatz Props., LLC v Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1214 (Del. 2012).
43. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 858 (Del. Ch. 2012).
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breach of this contractual provision, as well as a breach of the duty of
loyalty, which he said applies to managers of Delaware limited liability
companies as a default matter.44
The Supreme Court affirmed Chancellor Strine's holding that the
manager was "subject to fiduciary duties and that he breached them,"
but it affirmed "exclusively on contractual grounds. '45  The Delaware
Supreme Court chastised Chancellor Strine for discoursing on "default
fiduciary duties," concluding, "[w]here, as here, the dispute over whether
fiduciary standards apply could be decided solely by reference to the
LLC Agreement, it was improvident and unnecessary for the trial court
to reach out and decide, sua sponte, the default fiduciary duty issue as a
matter of statutory construction.
46
The Delaware courts and legislature have been exploring the
boundaries of fiduciary and contractual duties in noncorporate business
entities for many years. In a 2000 opinion involving a limited partnership
then-Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine interpreted § 17-1101(d)(2) of the
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 47 as authorizing
"the elimination, modification, or enhancement of [traditional] fiduciary
duties in the written agreement governing the limited partnership. '4  On
appeal the Delaware Supreme Court highlighted this "questionable stat-
utory interpretation" and observed, "[t]here is no mention in [the stat-
ute] that a limited partnership agreement may eliminate the fiduciary du-
ties or liabilities of a general partner. '49 In response to this opinion the
Delaware legislature amended the limited partnership statute in 2004 to
44. Id. at 851 ("[B]ecause the LLC Act provides for principles of equity to apply, because LLC
managers are clearly fiduciaries, and because fiduciaries owe the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care,
the LLC Act starts with the default that managers of LLCs owe enforceable fiduciary duties.").
45. Gatz Props., 59 A.3d at 1214.
46. Id. at 1218.
47. This section of the Act provided in relevant part:
(c) It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract
and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.
(d) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduci-
ary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited partnership or to another partner or to an-
other person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, (1) any such
partner or other person acting under the partnership agreement shall not be liable to the limited
partnership or to any such other partner or to any such other person for the partner's or other
person's good faith reliance on the provisions of the partnership agreement, and (2) the partner's
or other person's duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in the partner-
ship agreement.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (2000).
48. Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., No. CIV.A. 15754, 2000 WL
1476663, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2000). Vice-Chancellor Strine cited an earlier opinion by then-
Chancellor William Chandler, supporting the view that partners in a limited partnership could elimi-
nate fiduciary duties altogether. See Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("Consid-
ering § 17-1101(d) of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act's apparently broad li-
cense to enhance, reform, or even eliminate fiduciary duty protections, it is unclear how the market
goes about pricing the value of protections afforded to limited partners in any particular flavor of lim-
ited partnership.").
49. Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167-68 (Del. 2002).
The Court also referred to Vice-Chancellor Strine's statement as "dubious dictum." Id. at 168.
No. 5] 1789
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
expressly allow for the elimination of fiduciary duties in the partnership
agreement.0
Also in 2004, this same provision made its way into the Delaware
Limited Liability Company Act ("DLLCA"), a which applied in Gatz.
Both statutes also contain a provision expressing the "policy of this chap-
ter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract
and to the enforceability of [partnership or limited liability company]
agreements."52 Interpreting these provisions, the Delaware courts allow
for complete waiver of fiduciary obligation. 3 In Gatz Chancellor Strine
took up the companion question: if the participants in an LLC are silent
about fiduciary duties, should the courts impose fiduciary duties as de-
fault rules even though the DLLCA does not expressly provide for
them?
Chancellor Strine made a strong case for default fiduciary duties in
Delaware limited liability companies by analogizing to corporate law,5 4
invoking statutory clues,55 and reasoning from the structure of the man-
ager's relationship to the business entity. 6 Chancellor Strine also read
the foregoing statutory developments as supportive of default fiduciary
duties:
If the equity backdrop I just discussed did not apply to LLCs, then
the 2004 [amendment] would have been logically done differently.
Why is this so? Because the Amendment would have instead said
something like: "The managers, members, and other persons of the
LLC shall owe no duties of any kind to the LLC and its members
except as set forth in this statute and the LLC agreement. 5 7
As noted above, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Chancellor
Strine's holding, but added:
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2014) (stating that a partner's "duties maybe expanded
or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement").
51. Id. § 18-1101(c).
52. Id. §§ 17-1101(c), 18-1101(b).
53. See, e.g., Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, No. 5989-VCN, 2012 WL 34442, at *13
(Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012) ("Alternate entity legislation reflects the Legislature's decision to allow such
ventures to be governed without the traditional fiduciary duties, if that is what the ... governing doc-
ument provides for, and allows conduct that, in a different context, would be sanctioned.").
54. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch. 2012) ("The Delaware
LLC Act does not plainly state that the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care apply by default
as to managers or members of a limited liability company. In that respect, of course, the LLC Act is
not different than the DGCL, which does not do that either.").
55. Id. at 850 ("[T]he rules of equity apply in the LLC context by statutory mandate, creating an
even stronger justification for application of fiduciary duties grounded in equity to managers of LLCs
to the extent that such duties have not been altered or eliminated under the relevant LLC agree-
ment."); id. at 852 ("[W]hy would the General Assembly amend the LLC Act to provide for the elimi-
nation of (and the exculpation for) 'something' if there were no 'something' to eliminate (or excul-
pate) in the first place?").
56. Id. at 850 51 ("The manager of an LLC has more than an arms-length, contractual relation-
ship with the members of the LLC. Rather, the manager is vested with discretionary power to manage
the business of the LLC.") (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 851 (citing Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *9 (Del.
Ch. May 7, 2008), in which the court found that an agreement containing this language waived all fidu-
ciary duties except those provided for by contract).
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[T]he merits of the issue whether the LLC statute does-or does
not-impose default fiduciary duties is one about which reasonable
minds could differ. Indeed, reasonable minds arguably could con-
clude that the statute-which begins with the phrase, "[to the ex-
tent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person
has duties (including fiduciary duties)"-is consciously ambiguous.
That possibility suggests that the "organs of the Bar" (to use the tri-
al court's phrase) may be well advised to consider urging the Gen-
eral Assembly to resolve any statutory ambiguity on this issue. 58
This statement by the Delaware Supreme Court bears the finger-
prints of then-Chief Justice Myron Steele, who has long endorsed con-
tractual freedom regarding fiduciary duties in noncorporate business en-
tities. In a 2007 law review article, Chief Justice Steele concluded that
"parties to contractual entities such as limited liability partnerships and
limited liability companies should be free ... to adopt or reject any fidu-
ciary duty obligation by contract. '59 In a 2009 law review article, Chief
Justice Steele took an even stronger position, arguing "that default fidu-
ciary duties violate the strong policy favoring freedom of contract enun-
ciated by Delaware's legislature," and that "the costs of default fiduciary
duties outweigh the minimal benefits that they provide. ' 60 Although the
Supreme Court opinion in Gatz did not attempt to counter Chancellor
Strine point by point, it appears that Chief Justice Steele was attempting
to preserve that argument for another day. In the meantime, another de-
cision from the Court of Chancery added weight to Chancellor Strine's
conclusion.61 The Delaware legislature has now resolved the issue with
an amendment in 2013, expressly confirming that fiduciary duties exist in
Delaware limited liability companies, unless otherwise provided in the
LLC agreement.62
The issue of default fiduciary duties in Delaware limited liability
companies has been resolved by the Delaware legislature, but the notion
of "contractually adopted fiduciary duties" remains conceptually puz-
zling. Generally speaking, courts impose fiduciary duties whenever the
structure of a relationship suggests that fiduciary duties are justified (and
the parties have not contracted out of fiduciary duties). The Delaware
Supreme Court should have done this in Gatz, as Chancellor Strine did
in his lower court opinion. Courts need not wait for contractual authori-
zation, though they may look to contract for expansions or restrictions on
traditional duties. Thus, in most relationships parties do not "opt in" to
58. Gatz Props., 59 A.3d at 1219.
59. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and
Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007).
60. Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 221, 223 24 (2009).
61. See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 663 (Del. Ch. 2012).
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2013) ("In any case not provided for in this chapter,
the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties and the
law merchant, shall govern.").
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fiduciary duties, except to the extent that they choose to organize them-
selves in fiduciary relationships.63
IV. A SIMPLE PROPOSAL
The notion of "contractually adopted fiduciary duties" introduced
by the Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Gatz would make sense only
under the assumption that managers of Delaware limited liability com-
panies are not subject to the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a default term.
Outside of this context-that is,fiduciary relationships that do not invoke
a duty of loyalty without contractual authorization -the only context in
which "contractually adopted fiduciary duties" might have traction is
nonfiduciary relationships in which the parties wish to invoke a duty of
loyalty that would otherwise be absent. Independent contracting parties
often demand some form of loyalty-for example, an obligation not to
compete is essentially a demand that the constrained party behave loyal-
ly-but they generally would not think to "contract in" to the fiduciary
regime because the fiduciary duty of loyalty simply does not make sense
outside of fiduciary relationships. Nevertheless, as described below, this
has happened, and I propose a simple test for courts that might face this
issue in the future: when a duty arises from the language of a contract,
that duty is a contractual duty, but if a duty arises as a matter of common
law because the structure of the relationship comports with the descrip-
tion of fiduciary relationships, that duty is a fiduciary duty.
Occasionally parties in a fiduciary relationship impose contractual
obligations that look like fiduciary duties. This was Chancellor Strine's
view of the parties in Gatz, and he dealt with this contractual provision
appropriately, interpreting the term to discern the intention of the con-
tracting parties as he would with any other contract term.64 In other in-
stances, nonfiduciaries may attempt to invoke fiduciary duties by con-
tract. The best known example of this phenomenon in Delaware law is
Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, in which three limited partners were
contractually subjected to a "duty of loyalty" designed to prevent them
from competing with the limited partnership.65 Traditionally limited
partners have not owed fiduciary duties to the partnership because they
do not exercise discretion over the affairs of the partnership.66 In this
case, however, then-Vice-Chancellor Myron Steele reasoned:
63. Ribstein, Partners, supra note 7, at 218 ("[S]ince one can choose from among various fiduci-
ary and nonfiduciary standard forms, an unsophisticated party can choose to enter into a fiduciary-
type contract and seek the fiduciary's advice.").
64. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 857 (Del. Ch. 2012).
65. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, 724 A.2d 571, 574 (Del. Ch. 1998). The Limited Partner-
ship Agreement in that case stated, "[e]ach Partner acknowledges its duty of loyalty to the Partnership
and agrees to take no action to harm (or that would reasonably be expected to harm) the Partnership
or any Affiliated Entity." Id. at 580.
66. In a post-trial opinion in Cantor, Vice-Chancellor Steele acknowledged exceptions to this
rule when limited partners exercised control over the partnership or the general partner, thus creating
a fiduciary relationship. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, No. 16297, 2000 WL 307370, at *20 21
(Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2000).
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Where a fiduciary duty of loyalty is expressly written into an
agreement, or where authority is granted to include this provision at
a later time, I must conclude that the parties bargained for the pro-
vision. That Delaware courts uphold bargained-for fiduciary duties
contained in limited partnership agreements is crucial to the orderly
management of, and the related, economic success of, those limited
partnerships.67
Vice-Chancellor Steele referred to this "duty of loyalty" as a "fidu-
ciary duty," which caused a fair amount of uncertainly regarding the con-
tent and analysis of the provision. 6 In the end, however, he interpreted
the provision like any other contract term: "The duty of loyalty pro-
claimed in the 1996 Partnership Agreement requires no dependency up-
on a default concept to a narrow definition derived from corporate
common law. The scope of the duties owed by the parties must be de-
termined by reference to the nature of this particular business enter-
p r is e .
'69
The noncorporate entity statutes in Delaware contemplate the pos-
sibility that fiduciary duties may be "expanded,"70 but few people even
attempt to impose the fiduciary duty of loyalty outside of fiduciary rela-
tionships. Delaware courts have explored the expansion of fiduciary law
beyond its traditional boundaries in cases involving creditors,71 but these
cases do not involve a contract attempting to impose fiduciary obliga-
tions in the creditor relationship.72 Rather, the courts are weighing a pol-
icy whether to allow for enforcement of fiduciary duties by creditors
when a firm is insolvent.73 In the context of preferred shareholders the
67. 724 A.2d at 582. Cantor's invocation of "bargained-for fiduciary duties" has never been cited
by another court, but the Delaware Supreme Court in Cantor accepted the notion of a "contractually-
imposed fiduciary duty of loyalty." Cantor v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., 755 A.2d 387, (table) (Del.
2000).
68. The parties debated whether a limited partner without management responsibilities could
possibly be subjected to a fiduciary duty of loyalty. Cantor, 2000 WL 307370, at *22. Under the analy-
sis in this Essay, this sort of contractual imposition of fiduciary obligation would be impossible, but in
his post-trial opinion, Vice-Chancellor Steele seemed to invite such contract provisions:
The duty of loyalty that parties may impose upon one another by mutual assent in a contract,
whether management, operational, or overnance responsibilities follow or not, is a mutual ex-
chaiwe of a promise to treat one another with ood faith, trust, confidence and candor. It is a
promise articulated to define a mutually agreed relationship explicitly beyond that of any "im-
plied" duty of 2ood faith in an ordinary contract. This is hardly a shockin2 expectation to seek
and to bargain for even in the harsh, competitive world of brokering Treasuries.
Id.
69. Id.
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §17-1101(d) (2014) (limited partnerships); id. §18-1101(c) (limited
liability companies).
71. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007) ("[C]reditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims
against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties.").
72. Cf. Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for
Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 817 (2008) (arguing that "[p]rivate contracting alone should be effective
to shift managers' loyalties in favor of creditors").
73. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 ("When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insol-
vency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the
best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.").
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Delaware courts seem actively hostile to the contractual invocation of fi-
duciary principles, applying a rule of strict construction when interpret-
ing the terms of preferred stock.74 Perhaps not surprisingly, given the
analysis in Part II, the demand for the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not high
absent an open-ended delegation of management power or the exercise
of discretion over a critical resource belonging to another.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have argued that the nature of the duty of loyalty
can be important in cases where the parties invoke fiduciary concepts in
their contracts. In the wake of statutory amendments in Delaware this
issue seems unlikely to arise in fiduciary relationships, and in nonfiduci-
ary relationships, most parties do not wish to invoke a fiduciary duty of
loyalty. When contracting parties invoke fiduciary concepts, however,
the only sensible approach for courts is to interpret those provisions as
they interpret other contract terms. 75
74. See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of
Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 84(-44 (2004).
75. A distinct set of problems arises from treating fiduciary duty as a species of implied contract
terms. See Smith & Lee, supra note 28, at 622 ("One problem is that viewing fiduciary duties as con-
tract terms implies that judges should craft particular rules for the parties. Often framed in terms of a
hypothetical bargain, this approach urges judges to choose the result the parties would have chosen
had they anticipated the situation at issue, but this sort of reasoning is quite different from deciding
simply whether the fiduciary acted appropriately within the scope of her discretion." (footnotes omit-
ted)).
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